The order and lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic complements do not survive a minimal introduction of strategic substitutes: in a lattice game in which all-but-one players exhibit strategic complements (with one player exhibiting strict strategic complements), and the remaining player exhibits strict strategic substitutes, no two equilibria are comparable. More generally, in a lattice game, if either (1) just one player has strict strategic complements and another player has strict strategic substitutes, or (2) just one player has strict strategic substitutes and has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any restrictions on the strategic interaction among the other players, no two equilibria are comparable. In such cases, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, in such cases, with linearly ordered strategy spaces, the game has at most one symmetric equilibrium. Several examples are presented. JEL Numbers: C70, C72
Introduction
Games with strategic complements (GSC) and games with strategic substitutes (GSS) formalize two basic economic interactions and have widespread applications. 1 In GSC, best-response of each player is weakly increasing (or non-decreasing) in actions of the other players, and in GSS, best-response of each player is weakly decreasing (or non-increasing) in the actions of the other players. 2
As is well-known, in GSC, the equilibrium set has nice order and structure properties: there always exist a smallest and a largest equilibrium, 3 and more 1 Such games are defined in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) , and as they show, models of strategic investment, entry deterrence, technological innovation, dumping in international trade, natural resource extraction, business portfolio selection, and others can be viewed in a more unifying framework according as the variables under consideration are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Earlier developments are provided in Topkis (1978) and Topkis (1979) .
2 Versions of such games arise in diverse economic environments, including competitive strategy, public goods, industrial organization, natural resource utilization, manufacturing analysis, team management, tournaments, resource allocation, business portfolio development, principal-agent modeling, multi-lateral contracting, auctions, technological innovation, behavioral economics, and others. 3 Various versions of this result can be seen in Topkis (1978) , Topkis (1979) , Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987) , Sobel (1988) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , among others. For more recent developments, confer Echenique (2002) , Quah (2007) , and Quah and Strulovici (2009). generally, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice. 4 These properties have proved useful in several ways; for example, they help to provide simple and intuitive algorithms to compute equilibria, and they help to show monotone comparative statics of equilibria in such games.
In contrast, in GSS, the equilibrium set is completely unordered -no two equilibria are comparable (in the standard product order). 5 Consequently, in such games, with multiple equilibria, techniques based on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set, or the existence of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid. Typically, different techniques are required to analyze such games.
The existing results show that when we move from a setting where all players exhibit strategic complements to a setting where all players exhibit strategic substitutes, the order structure of the equilibrium set is destroyed completely. A central motivation for the present analysis is to inquire when and by how much the order structure of the equilibrium set is affected as we move player-by-player from a setting of all players with strategic complements to a setting of all players with strategic substitutes.
The new results here show that the nice order and structure properties of GSC do not survive a minimal introduction of strategic substitutes, in the following sense. Consider a lattice game 6 in which all-but-one players ex-4 See Zhou (1994) . 5 See Roy and Sabarwal (2008) . 6 Intuitively, a lattice game is a strategic game in which every player's strategy set is hibit strategic complements (with one player exhibiting strict strategic complements 7 ), and the remaining player exhibits strict strategic substitutes. 8 In this case, no two equilibria in the game are comparable (in the product order).
The results shown here are stronger, and apply to lattice games with more general strategic interaction among the players. In particular, in any lattice game, if there is reason to believe that either (1) just one player has strict strategic complements and another player has strict strategic substitutes, or (2) just one player has strict strategic substitutes and has singletonvalued best-responses, then without any restrictions on the strategic interaction among the other players, we may conclude that no two equilibria are comparable. We present several standard examples (extended matching pennies, Cournot duopoly with spillovers, and Dove-Hawk-type game) to highlight these results.
In such cases, with multiple equilibria, techniques based on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set, or the existence of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid. Moreover, in such cases, the equilibrium set is a nonempty, complete lattice, if, and only if, the equilibrium is unique. In addition, if player strategy spaces are linearly ordered, then the set of symmetric equilibria a complete lattice, and every player's payoff function is continuous in own variable. No restriction is placed on strategic interaction across other players. The formal definition is given in the next section. 7 Intuitively, best response is strictly increasing in other player strategies. 8 Intuitively, best response is strictly decreasing in other player strategies.
is non-empty, if, and only if, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Games that have both strategic complements and strategic substitutes arise naturally in many applications: from the simple textbook game of matching pennies, to several examples from competitive strategy and industrial organization in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) , to games with contests in Dixit (1987) , among others. Therefore, the results here have implications for a wide variety of applications.
The proofs here are simple and are not meant to be a methodological contribution. Some of the simplicity arises naturally in many analyses of questions related to strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Some of it arises from the recent resurgence of work in strategic substitutes that has provided valuable insights regarding similarities and differences between GSC and GSS. 9 And some of it arises from a new insight into fundamental relations underlying the order structure of the equilibrium set in the presence of strategic substitutes.
The results here point out that an important component (the order structure of the equilibrium set) underlying the justifiably celebrated theory of games with strategic complements does not survive a simple extension of the 9 For some developments in this area, confer Amir (1996) , Villas-Boas (1997), Amir and Lambson (2000) , Schipper (2003) , Zimper (2007) , Roy and Sabarwal (2008) theory to include other realistic cases. Therefore, there is a need to develop new techniques to study additional cases of interest.
The results here are related to Roy and Sabarwal (2008) , but cover cases of interest that cannot be covered in their framework. In particular, a central case in this paper, where all-but-one players have strategic complements, is ruled out by their assumptions. 10 Moreover, the proofs here are different:
they are simpler and rely more directly on economic intuition.
We use the standard product order on the product of the player strategy spaces. This is a natural and intuitive order to consider in lattice games, and is used widely in GSC and in GSS. Recall that in the special case of a two-player GSS, reversing the order on the strategy space of one player transforms that game into a GSC, and results for a GSC apply to this special case. More generally, there may be no such transformation that leaves the equilibrium set invariant. For example, the textbook example of a two-player matching pennies game (a game with both complements and substitutes) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore, cannot be viewed as a GSC, because a GSC always has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Similarly, Roy and Sabarwal (2011) provide an example of a three-player, two-action, Dove-10 This implies that the basic building blocks of the interactions studied in this papertwo-player games in which one player has strategic complements and another has strategic substitutes -are ruled out by their assumpions. In fact, none of the applications in section 3 are covered by their assumptions. Details are presented in the appendix.
Hawk-type GSS that has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore, cannot be viewed as a GSC.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section, section 2, sets up the model, section 3 proves the main results and provides several applications, and section 4 concludes.
Lattice Games
Let I be a non-empty set of players, and for each player i, a strategy space that is a partially ordered set, denoted (X i , i ), and a real-valued payoff function,
As usual, the domain of each f i is the product of the strategy spaces, (X, ), endowed with the product order. 11 The strategic
1. X i is a non-empty, complete lattice, 12 and 2. For every
The definition of a lattice game here is very general. In particular, no restriction is placed on whether players have strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Consequently, this definition allows for general games with 11 For notational convenience, we shall usually drop the index i from the notation for the partial order. 12 This paper uses standard lattice terminology. See, for example, Topkis (1998) . 13 In the standard order interval topology. strategic complements, general games with strategic substitutes, and mixtures of the two.
This definition of a lattice game yields well-defined best-responses, as follows. For each player i, the best response of player i to x −i is denoted
, and is given by arg max
As the payoff function is continuous, and the strategy space is compact in the order interval topology, for every i, and for every
given by BR(x) = (BR i (x −i )) i∈I , denote the joint best-response correspondence. As usual, a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game is a profile of player actions x such that x ∈ BR(x). The equilibrium set of the game is given by
Of particular interest to us are cases where the best-response of a player is either increasing (the case of strategic complements) or decreasing (the case of strategic substitutes) with respect to the strategies of the other players. Here, 14 Needless to say, at this level of generality, a lattice game may have no Nash equilibrium.
For example, the textbook two-player matching pennies game is admissible here, and has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Roy and Sabarwal (2011) provide an example of a three-player Dove-Hawk-type game (a GSS) with no Nash equilibrium. One may assume additional conditions to invoke standard results to guarantee existence of equilibrium via Brouwer-Schauder type theorems, or Kakutani-Glicksberg-Ky Fan type theorems, or other types of results. We do not make these assumptions so that our results apply whenever equilibrium exists, regardless of whether a specific equilibrium existence theorem is invoked, or whether an equilibrium is shown to exist directly in a game.
increasing or decreasing are with respect to an appropriately defined set order.
Recall that in a lattice game, if the payoff function of each player i is quasisupermodular in x i , 15 and satisfies the single-crossing property in (
then the best-response correspondence of each player is nondecreasing 17 in the standard induced set order. 18 Such a game is termed a lattice game with strategic complements, or GSC, for short.
In a GSC, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice (see Zhou (1994)), and there exist a smallest equilibrium and a largest equilibrium (various versions of this result can be seen in Topkis (1978) , Topkis (1979) , Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987) , Sobel (1988) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , among others).
15 As in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , a function f :
When a player's best response is a function, this translates into the standard definition of a weakly increasing function; For non-trivial results involving strategic substitutes, it is useful to consider players with best responses that are "strictly" decreasing with respect to the strategies of the other players. To formalize strict strategic substitutes, consider the following set order. Let X be a lattice. For non-empty subsets
When a player's best response is a function, this translates into the standard definition of a weakly decreasing function;
A, B of X, A is strictly lower than B, if for every a ∈ A, and for ev-
This definition is a slight strengthening of the following set order defined in Shannon (1995) 
Strictly decreasing correspondences are defined in a natural manner using the strictly lower than set order. Let X be a lattice and T be a partially ordered
φ(t ) is strictly lower than φ(t ). In particular, strictly decreasing correspondences that are singleton-valued are equivalent to the standard definition of a strictly decreasing function. 21 Similarly, we shall also find it useful to define strictly increasing correspondences. A correspondence φ : T X is strictly increasing, if for every t ≺ t , φ(t ) is strictly lower than φ(t ). When the correspondence is a function, this is equivalent to the standard definition of a strictly increasing function. 22
22 Recall that Shannon (1995) provides conditions on payoff functions that guarantee a comparison in the completely lower than set order. Moreover, in finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces, Edlin and Shannon (1998) provide an additional intuitive and easy-to-use differentiable condition regarding strictly increasing marginal returns to derive a comparison in the strictly lower than set order. Both these conditions can be adapted easily for strategic
With these ideas in place, player i has strict strategic substitutes, if BR i is strictly decreasing, and player i has strict strategic complements,
if BR i is strictly increasing.
Results and Applications
This section provides the main results in this paper and provides several applications. Theorem 1 shows that in any lattice game, one player with strict strategic substitutes and one player with strict strategic complements are sufficient to destroy the order structure of the equilibrium set, as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a lattice game in which one player has strict strategic substitutes and another player has strict strategic complements.
If x * andx are distinct equilibria, then x * andx are not comparable.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 has strict strategic substitutes, player 2 has strict strategic complements, and suppose the distinct equilibria are comparable, withx ≺ x * .
As case 1, supposex −1 ≺ x * −1 . Thenx 1 = BR 1 (x −1 ) and x * 1 = BR 1 (x * −1 ), and by strict strategic substitutes, x * 1 ≺x 1 , contradictingx ≺ x * .
As case 2, supposex 1 ≺ x * 1 . Thenx −2 ≺ x * −2 . Thenx 2 ∈ BR 2 (x −2 ) and x * 2 ∈ BR 2 (x * −2 ), and by strict strategic complements,x 2 ≺ x * 2 , whence
substitutes.
x −1 ≺ x * −1 , and we are in case 1. Thus x * andx are not comparable.
Notice the simple economic intuition in this proof. In case 1 in the proof, if opponents of player 1 play higher strategies in the x * equilibrium than in thê
x equilibrium, then player 1 (with strict strategic substitutes) must be playing a strictly lower strategy in the x * equilibrium than in thex equilibrium, and therefore, the equilibria are non-comparable. Case 2 essentially says that witĥ
x ≺ x * , player 1 cannot be playing a higher strategy in the x * equilibrium.
For if he did, then player 2 (with strict strategic complements) is playing a higher strategy in the x * equilibrium, and therefore, the opponents of player 1 are playing higher strategies in the x * equilibrium, whence player 1 is playing a strictly lower strategy in the x * equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
Notice that Roy and Sabarwal (2008) show similar results for the case where the best-response correspondence satisfies a never-increasing property.
Their property is satisfied in lattice games in which every player has strict strategic substitutes, but it rules out a central case in this paper: all-but-one players have strategic complements, and the remaining player has strategic substitutes. 23 In particular, none of the examples here are covered by their results. Moreover, the proofs here are different; they are simpler and rely more 23 In fact, their property is not satisfied when all-but-one players have strategic complements, the remaining player has at least two actions, and there are no restrictions on the strategic interaction with the remaining player. Moreover, it is not satisfied even when these properties only hold locally. Details are provided in the appendix.
directly on economic intuition.
Let's look at some applications of theorem 1. and if one player goes for double-or-nothing, that is, plays either (H, H) or (T, T ), and the other does not, (that is, plays (H, T ) or (T, H),) then the player who goes for double-or-nothing loses and pays $1 to the other player.
The payoffs of this zero-sum game are summarized in Figure 1 .
Assuming H ≺ T , and with the standard product order, the strategy space also shown graphically in figure 2. Suppose player 1's best response correspondence is given as follows: BR 1 (a 2 ) = {d 1 }, BR 1 (b 2 ) = BR 1 (c 2 ) = {b 1 , c 1 }, and BR 1 (d 2 ) = {a 1 }, and player 2's best response correspondence is given as follows: BR 2 (a 1 ) = {a 2 }, BR 2 (b 1 ) = BR 2 (c 1 ) = {b 2 , c 2 }, and BR 2 (d 1 ) = {d 2 }.
Both are depicted in figure 2. It is easy to check that this example satisfies the conditions of theorem 1: player 1 has strict strategic substitutes, player 2 has strict strategic complements. Consequently, the four Nash equilibria (b 1 , b 2 ), (b 1 , c 2 ), (c 1 , b 2 ), and (c 1 , c 2 ) are all non-comparable. (Notice that double-ornothing matching pennies is a special case of this example.)
BR 2 (b 1 ) = BR 2 (c 1 ) BR 2 (a 1 ) BR 1 (a 2 ) BR 1 (d 2 ) BR 1 (b 2 ) = BR 1 (c 2 ) Figure 2 : A General Two-Player, Four-Point Lattice Game
For completeness, observe that non-comparability of equilibria may hold with conditions weaker than one player with strict strategic complements and one player with strict strategic substitutes. The next application provides a two-player game with weak strategic substitutes (that is, best response of each player is decreasing in the completely lower than set order) and weak strategic complements (best response of each player is increasing in the completely lower than set order) 24 that has non-comparability of equilibria.
Example 3 (Matching Pennies: Double-or-Nothing, Part 2). Consider the following modification to the game of double-or-nothing matcing pennies.
If both players go for double-or-nothing and the pennies match (that is, the Assume the same order structure as in double-or-nothing matching pennies.
Notice that player 1 has weak strategic substitutes, player 2 has weak strategic complements, and the four Nash equilibria are all non-comparable.
The intuition behind theorem 1 can be taken further, in the sense that when the best-response of the player with strict strategic substitutes is singletonvalued, the requirement of a player with strict strategic complements can be dropped, as follows.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a lattice game in which one player has strict strategic substitutes, and this player's best-response is singleton-valued.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 has strict strategic substitutes with singleton-valued best responses, and suppose the distinct equilibriax and x * are comparable, withx ≺ x * .
Case 1 remains the same as above. Supposex −1 ≺ x * −1 . Thenx 1 ∈ BR 1 (x −1 ) and x * 1 ∈ BR 1 (x * −1 ), and by strict strategic substitutes, x * 1 ≺x 1 ,
Intuitively, in theorem 2, ifx ≺ x * , then we need only consider the case when the opponents of player 1 play higher strategies; that is,x −1 ≺ x * −1 .
For ifx −1 = x * −1 , then by singleton-valued best responses, the best response of player 1 tox −1 is the same as her best response to x * −1 , and thus both equilibria are the same, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 2 formalizes the intuition that adding one player with strict strategic substitutes completely destroys the order structure of the equilibrium set.
Here's an application of theorem 2.
Example 4 (Cournot Duopoly with Spillovers). Consider two firms competing as Cournot duopolists. Let the (inverse) market demand be given by p = a − b(x 1 + x 2 ). Firm 1 has constant marginal cost, c 1 ; its profit is given by π 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = (a − b(x 1 + x 2 ))x 1 − c 1 x 1 . Firm 1's output leads to a (perhaps) non-monotonic cost spillover for firm 2, denoted s(x 1 ), affecting profits of firm 2 as follows: π 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = (a − b(x 1 + x 2 ))x 2 − c 2 x 2 s(x 1 ). Intuitively, we may view firm 1 as an established firm (or incumbent), and firm 2 as a young firm (or a relatively new entrant). The young firm receives cost externalities from the established firm, perhaps by making it easier to get industry-specific talent, or having access to superior supply chain management at a lower cost, and so on. Suppose a = 15, b = 1 2 , c 1 = 11, c 2 = 3, and s(
This spillover function is non-negative and non-monotonic: as firm 1's output increases from 0 to 1+ √ 2 2 ≈ 1.2, the spillover reduces from 3 to a local minimum of about 2.1, and then starts to increase.
In this case, the best responses are given by BR 1 (x 2 ) = max{4 − 1 2 x 2 , 0}, and BR 2 (x 1 ) = max{6 + x 1 + 3x 2 1 − 2x 3 1 , 0}. It is easy to check that there are three Nash equilibria; given by ( 1 2 , 7), (2, 4), and (4, 0), and these are non-comparable, as shown in figure 4.
Theorem 2 shows that when the best-response of the player with strict strategic substitutes is singleton-valued, the condition in theorem 1 regarding one player with strict strategic complements can be dropped. Example 5 below shows that when the best-response of the player with strict strategic substitutes is not singleton-valued, this condition in theorem 1 cannot be dropped, in general.
Example 5 (A Dove-Hawk-type game). Consider the lattice game with If we consider a lattice game in which all players have strategic complements, then the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice. In particular, every pair of equilibria has a smallest larger equilibrium, and a largest smaller equilibrium.
If we modify this game to require that one player has strict strategic complements, and another has strict strategic substitutes, then we destroy the order structure of the equilibrium set completely. That is, no two equilibria are comparable.
Similarly, if we modify this game to require that one player has strict strategic substitutes, and that player's best-response is singleton-valued (perhaps because that payoff function is strictly quasi-concave), then again the order structure of the equilibrium set is destroyed completely.
Of course, the results here are stronger, and apply to general lattice games, not just to lattice games with strategic complements. In particular, in any lattice game, if there is reason to believe that either (1) one player has strict strategic complements and another player has strict strategic substitutes, or
(2) just one player has strict strategic substitutes and has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any restrictions on the strategic interaction among the other players, we may conclude that no two equilibria are comparable.
Indeed, the results above yield the following corollary immediately.
Corollary 1. Let Γ satisfy the conditions of either theorem 1 or theorem 2.
The following are equivalent.
(1) E is a non-empty lattice
(2) E is a singleton
(3) E is a non-empty, complete lattice
Proof. The only part that needs to checked is that (1) implies (2). Suppose E is a non-empty lattice. If it has one element only, then (2) is proved. If it has two elements, say x * =x, then it contains the join and meet of these two elements, and the join and meet are distinct and comparable, contradicting the theorems above.
Thus, in all such cases, with multiple equilibria, techniques based on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set, or the existence of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid. Consequently, these results point to the need to develop alternative techniques to study such cases.
Theorems 1 and 2 also imply immediately that when strategy spaces of players are linearly ordered, 25 the game has at most one symmetric equilibrium, 26 as formalized next.
Corollary 2. Let Γ satisfy the conditions of either theorem 1 or theorem 2, and suppose the strategy space of each player is linearly ordered.
The set of symmetric equilibria is non-empty, if, and only if, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Conclusion
The results here show that in a lattice game in which all-but-one players exhibit strategic complements (with one player exhibiting strict strategic complements), and the remaining player exhibits strict strategic substitutes, no two equilibria are comparable. Therefore, the order and lattice structure of the equilibrium set in a GSC may not survive a simple extension of the theory to include other realistic cases.
More generally, in a lattice game, if either (1) just one player has strict strategic complements and another player has strict strategic substitutes, or 25 As usual, linearly ordered means that every pair of strategies is comparable. A linear order is sometimes termed a complete order. 26 An equilibrium is symmetric, if every player plays the same strategy in equilibrium.
(2) just one player has strict strategic substitutes and has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any restrictions on the strategic interaction among the other players, no two equilibria are comparable.
In such cases, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, in such cases, with linearly ordered strategy spaces, the game has at most one symmetric equilibrium.
Games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements arise in many applications. The examples above show their application in some standard cases.
The results here have several additional implications. For example, with multiple equilibria, starting from one equilibrium, algorithms to compute another equilibrium may be made more efficient by discarding two areas of the action space. Moreover, for the cases considered here, with multiple equilibria, the standard technique (in GSC) of using extremal Nash equilibria to exhibit monotone comparative statics is invalid. Similarly, for the cases considered here, with multiple equilibria, the standard technique (in GSC) of using best response dynamics to converge to extremal Nash equilbria to inquire about stability of equilibrium is invalid. Developing new techniques to address these questions forms the basis of continuing work.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that all-but-player-1 have weak strategic complements. Consider x 1 ≺ x 1 in X 1 , and x −1 ∈ X −1 . Then (x 1 , x −1 ) ≺ (x 1 , x −1 ). Let y 1 ∈ BR 1 (x −1 ). For each i = 1, let x −i = (x 1 , x −(1,i) ) and x −i = (x 1 , x −(1,i) ). Then for each i = 1, x −i ≺ x −i . For each such i, fix y i ∈ BR i (x −i ) and y i ∈ BR i (x −i ) arbitrarily. By weak strategic complements, y i y i . Thus, (x 1 , x −1 ) ≺ (x 1 , x −1 ), (y 1 , y −1 ) ∈ BR(x 1 , x −1 ), (y 1 , y −1 ) ∈ BR(x 1 , x −1 ), and (y 1 , y −1 ) (y 1 , y −1 ), contradicting the neverincreasing property.
Consequently, the case where all-but-one players exhibit weak strategic complements, and the remaining player has strategic substitutes is not covered by Roy and Sabarwal (2008) . It is precisely this case that starts the analysis in this paper: consider a movement away from the case of all strategic complements by introducing one player with strategic substitutes.
It is easy to see that the global nature of the definition of a never-increasing correspondence rules out more cases. In particular, a similar proof shows that cases with local weak strategic complements for the remaining players do not satisfy the never-increasing property. The Cournot duopoly with spillovers provides an intuitive example. In this case, player 2 does not have weak strategic complements. Nevertheless, the best-response correspondence does not satisfy the never-increasing property, because for example, for all > 0 sufficiently small, ( 1 2 , 7) ≺ ( 1 2 + , 7), but BR 2 ( 1 2 ) ≺ BR 2 ( 1 2 + ), and therefore, BR( 1 2 , 7) ≺ BR( 1 2 + , 7). This occurs, because player 2 has weak strategic complements in a neighborhood of 1 2 , even though he does not have weak strategic complements globally.
